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SPORTS LABOR RELATIONS: THE
ARBITRATOR'S TURN AT BAT
ROGER I. ABRAMS*
As we all know, there is something special about sports. A
quick look at the 1972 Supreme Court opinion in Flood v. Kuhn'
shows in dramatic fashion that we are not talking about just any
business enterprise. Justice Blackmun's opinion begins with a
hymn of praise for our national pastime: "It is a century and a
quarter since the New York Nine defeated the Knickerbockers 23
to 1 on Hoboken's Elysian Fields June 19, 1846 ... ."' He then
goes on to list "the many names . . . that have sparked the dia-
mond and its environs . . . Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Tris Speaker"'
and on and on through the great, the near-great and the not-so-
great. Finally, almost as an afterthought, he turns to the difficult
legal issues at hand.4
* Dean and Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center; B.A. Cornell University,
1967; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1970.
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Louisville Fifth An-
nual Labor and Employment Law Institute on May 19, 1988, and will appear in the Pro-
ceedings of the Institute.
1. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
2. Id. at 260-61.
3. Id. at 262.
4. The Court, in an embarrassing display of judicial rigidity, refused to overrule an
absurd precedent which declared the antitrust laws inapplicable to the baseball industry
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Justice Blackmun can be excused for his exuberance. Sports
does that to people. It is said that Chief Justice Earl Warren once
remarked that he always turned to the sports page first because
the sports page recorded people's accomplishments, while the front
page contained nothing but man's failures. Sporting events touch
something deep inside us. They exhilarate our spirit. They cele-
brate the human condition: our successes and our failures. Profes-
sor Michael Novak has written: "Sports are mysteries of youth and
aging, perfect action and decay, fortune and misfortune, strategy
and contingency."6 Sports are America's secular religion.'
It is not surprising then that there is also something quite spe-
cial about labor relations in professional sports. Sports figures were
the idols of our youth and remain an object of interest throughout
our adult lives. Being involved in sports labor relations brings us
close to these demigods. We are invited to visit Olympus.
Although an objective perspective is difficult to maintain when
dealing with starting pitchers, running backs or power forwards,
there are good reasons why sports labor law is so interesting. The
problems faced in sports labor relations are unique and quite com-
plex.' Labor relations in professional sports cover a broad spec-
because it did not involve interstate commerce. Fifty years earlier, Justice Holmes, writing
for the Court, concluded that baseball was a purely local affair and that the travel between
states was merely "incidental." Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922). Paradoxically, the Flood majority also ruled that state antitrust laws were pre-
empted by federal legislation because baseball was a matter of interstate commerce! The
decision can only be explained on the grounds that baseball is the national pastime, hardly
an objective legal principle.
5. Even the Pennsylvania Law Review could not control its sports mania. See Aside,
The Common Law Origin of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975). Judges in
non-sports cases cannot resist metaphors. See, e.g., Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d
712, 46 FEP Cases 1740, 1743 (2d Cir. 1988) ("A contrary holding would effectively permit
the county to 'strike out' Berl and Anderson without ever allowing them in the batter's
box.").
6. M. NOVAK, THE JoY OF SPORTS 24 (1976). In a similar vein, Melvin Mark and Jerald
Greenberg have recently written a provocative article explaining how sports rules reflect
American values. Evening the Score, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1987, 44-50. See also J.
MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA (1977); P. WEISS, SPORT: A PHILOSOPHIC INQUIRY (1969).
7. National League President A. Bartlett Giamatti recently wrote: "Sports are the
popular or people's religon in the country where Law is state church." 6 SPORTS LAW. 4, 6
(SUMMER 1988). SPORTS ARE ALSO A SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS. Sports, Inc., a short-lived maga-
zine that recently ceased publication, commissioned a study that found that the sports en-
terprise accounted for $47 billion in 1986 and thus was the nation's 25th largest industry.
N.Y. Times, December 2, 1987, at D33, col. 1.
8. Bob Berry, Bill Gould, and Paul Staudohar have recently explored the wide world
of sports labor law issues in their excellent treatise LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS (1986). It updates Weistart and Lowell's Prosserian treatment of all sports law is-
sues in THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979). See also R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF
THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES (1986).
[Vol. 5:1
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trum of activities.
Collective bargaining in professional sports is played out on
the front pages and on the evening news, and affects the millions
of Americans who draw daily sustenance from the games." The
day-to-day administration of sports collective bargaining agree-
ments is also quite interesting, although for the most part that
process is hidden from public view. One very public aspect of labor
relations in professional sports is the arbitration process. To bor-
row a sports media metaphor, let's look at labor arbitration in pro-
fessional sports "up close and personal."
Labor arbitration is the greatest invention of the American la-
bor movement.10 It is employed as the dispute-resolution mecha-
nism of choice in every unionized industry and covers all classes of
employees.11 It is not surprising that arbitration would find its way
into sports collective bargaining agreements.
Garden-variety grievances arising under the terms of these
agreements primarily involve player status and compensation.12 An
arbitrator addressing those types of cases uses decisional tech-
niques and standards common to all of arbitration." While the
terms of the collective bargaining agreements might be unique to
sports, the methods of analysis are not. With few exceptions, arbi-
tration in professional sports is like arbitration in other industries.
Grievance resolution in professional sports occasionally in-
volves fundamental issues that divide the clubs and the players.
The most important and famous of these grievance cases was de-
cided by Arbitrator Peter Seitz in 1975.14 In a case involving two
pitchers, the Dodgers' Andy Messersmith and the Expos' Dave
McNally, Seitz was asked by the Major League Baseball Players
Association to interpret the terms of the standard player contract,
in particular the provision which allowed a club to renew a player's
contract "for a period of one year." Management argued the option
clause itself was included in the agreement which would have been
renewed by exercising the clause, an interpretation that would
9. Berry, Gould and Staudohar describe the very public collective bargaining negotia-
tions that led up to the 1981 baseball strike and the 1982 football strike in their treatise,
LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 62-77, 123-52 (1986).
10. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965).
11. The Bureau of National Affairs survey of collective bargaining agreements found
that 99% of their sample of contracts contained an arbitration provision. BASIC PATTERNS IN
UNION CONTRACTS 37 (11th ed. 1986).
12. See R. BERRY, W. GOULD, & P. STAUDOHAR, supra note 8, at 241-46.
13. See Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making in
Labor Arbitration 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551 (1981).
14. In re Major League Baseball, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (1975).
19881
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have allowed perpetual reservation of a player to a particular club.
In a long and scholarly opinion, Arbitrator Seitz focused on the
plain meaning of the terms employed in the contract and found
that an option to extend for "one year" meant only one year and
no more.
15
By the stroke of an arbitrator's pen, the reserve system which
had existed in baseball since the 1880s'8 was dismantled. The
award fundamentally changed the economics of the sport. 17 Peter
Seitz knew the import of his decision. In fact, as he explained in
his opinion, he had encouraged the parties to resolve the matter
through negotiations. 8 Following his award and its affirmance on
appeal,19 the parties negotiated a contract that maintained a sub-
stantial portion of the reserve system,2 but the labor arbitration
process had changed the course of professional baseball history.'
15. Arbitrator Seitz also addressed management's argument that even a player not
under contract with a team could be "reserved" by that team under the Major League Base-
ball Rules. Interpreting those provisions, Seitz concluded that a player must be under con-
tract in order to be "reserved." Id. at 116.
16. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198, 202-04 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890),
cited in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 (1972). A commentator supplies details of the
origins of the reserve system in a recent note, Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration,
3 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 243, 245 (1987): "Orator Jim" O'Rourke of the Boston Beaneaters
quit the team when it would not buy him a uniform and jumped to the Providence nine. In
response, the National League owners met secretly to create a reserve system to keep play-
ers in their place.
17. The destruction of the reserve system triggered the end of the "good old days" of
roster stability and team loyalty. The order of the controlled monopsonistic market was lost
with the emergence of a free market in which talented athletes sell their services to the
highest bidder as if they were any other worker. The fans, of course, eventually pay the bill:
a high charge for seeing the same quality performances by the same performers.
One posited advantage of enhanced levels of compensation in a free marketplace is that
it will encourage entry by sellers who otherwise would not participate. But this effect is not
evident in professional sports. Boys (and to some extent girls) are encouraged to prepare for
a career in professional sports at least in important part because of the non-monetary goals
of fame and glory. These esoteric payoffs were present before the money explosion. It would
be difficult to prove that better players seek athletic careers today because of the potential
of higher salaries. The odds against a high-paying career in any professional sport are astro-
nomical. For example, of the more than half million boys who play high school basketball
each year, some fifty will play in the National Basketball Association.
18. In re Major League Baseball, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 117-18.
19. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
20. Under the 1976 collective bargaining agreement, players who contracted after Au-
gust 9, 1976, could become free agents after six years of major league service. The agreement
included a complicated reentry procedure with compensation through amateur draft selec-
tions for teams that lost free agents. The 1985 collective bargaining agreement abolished the
reentry draft and streamlined the compensation system.
21. One immediate effect of the decision was to change Messersmith's income. While
McNally returned home to Billings, Montana, where he and his brother Jim own two Ford
dealerships, free agent Messersmith signed a five-year $1.5 million contract with the Atlanta
[Vol. 5:1
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The new free agency system became a golden goose, and the
players harvested its golden eggs. 2  Free agency combined with sal-
ary arbitration to increase average player salaries by almost 650%
from 1976 to 1984. Management seemed incapable of resisting the
temptation to buy just one more superstar who might lift the club
to the pennant. Suddenly, the free agent market dried up as
quickly as it appeared. Major free agent superstars found no bid-
ders.28 The union alleged that the clubs had agreed to a boycott of
free agents in violation of a contract provision which prohibited
such collusion. 4
The Major League Baseball Players Association's grievance al-
leging collusion was brought to arbitration before Thomas Rob-
erts.25 Again employing fairly familiar tools of factual analysis, Ar-
bitrator Roberts concluded that the behavior of the clubs in
abruptly ending ten years of furious bidding for free agents could
only be explained as having been the product of prohibited collu-
sive conduct." Where there was smoke, there was fire - and a
Braves, becoming the second highest paid player in baseball (after Catfish Hunter). Prior to
his arbitration, the Dodgers had paid Messersmith $72,000 for the 1975 season during which
he won 19 games. Messersmith compiled an 11-11 record for the last place Braves in 1976,
while missing half the season after elbow surgery. The Braves sold his contract to the
Yankees, for whom he pitched just 22 innings in 1978. He was waived by the Yankees,
signed by the Dodgers and retired after a 2-4 season in 1979. He returned home to Soquel,
California, and in 1984 became the baseball coach at Cabrillo College. MacNow, "Messer-
smith, McNally: They Had No Idea .... " The Sporting News July 9, 1987, at 33. The
other player in this scenario, Arbitrator Peter Seitz, was immediately fired by Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn.
22. Even players without free agents rights reaped the benefits of the new regime.
Clubs would sign long-term contracts with junior players, effectively buying out their free
agency rights at a contract premium.
23. See Spitz, Is Collusion the Name of the Game?, N.Y. Times Magazine, July 12,
1987, at 22.
24. Paragraph H of Article XVIII of the current collective bargaining agreement be-
tween Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association provides:
The utilization or non-utilization of rights under [free agency] is an individual
matter to be determined solely by each Player and each Club for his or its own
benefit. Players shall not act in concert with other Players and Clubs shall not
act in concert with other Clubs.
25. In the Matter of Arbitration between Major League Baseball Players Association
and the Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs, Grievance Co. 86-2 (Sept. 21, 1987). It is
ironic that the no-collusion clause was first proposed by management to avoid free agent
players from presenting "package deals" to owners, as Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale did
with the Los Angeles Dodgers. The Players Association agreed to the clause if the promise
was made mutual.
26. The owners attempted to explain their disinterest in the 1986 crop of free agents
as the result of: (1) a ten year trend; (2) a general economic decline in the industry; and (3)
an unattractive group of prospects. Roberts responded that: (1) the owners behavior in 1986
was a dramatic change from prior competitive bidding and not the culmination of a trend;
(2) economic decline cannot excuse a contract violation; and (3) in a noncollusive market
19881
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contract violation.2 7 By way of an interim remedy, Arbitrator Rob-
erts ruled that the grievants were free agents and could negotiate
with any major league club.2 8 The labor arbitrator had again taken
his turn at bat. 9
While these grievance arbitration cases have been of crucial
importance in the history of sports labor relations, in particular in
the baseball industry, they are not really very different from arbi-
trations in other less public arenas. By comparison, baseball's sal-
ary arbitration system is absolutely unique. This method for set-
tling disputes over the salary of individual workers by final-offer
arbitration is employed in no other industry and in no other pro-
fessional sport.3 0
non-superstar players might garner more modest offers, but would still receive some offers.
There was but one other possible explanation for the owners' action-concerted action. In
addition to this circumstantial proof of collusive behavior, Roberts also relied upon the di-
rect evidence of discussions at four meetings of baseball owners where they were encouraged
to avoid "long-term contracts," a euphemism for not signing free agents.
27. The Roberts arbitration might be seen as the functional equivalent of the antitrust
case the players were never able to bring against Major League Baseball because Justice
Holmes had concluded 65 years earlier that baseball was not interstate commerce. See
supra note 4. Although solidly based on the contract and not the Sherman Act, the Players
Association's allegation, in essence, was that the owners were involved in a "combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade." Cf. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000
(D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
(As Players Association Executive Director Donald Fehr correctly noted in his response to
this paper at the Labor and Employment Law Institute, there are some major differences
between a grievance arbitration victory and a win in an antitrust suit. The prevailing party
in arbitration receives no treble damages, no attorneys' fees, and no court order enforceable
by contempt if violated.)
28. Chass, 7 in Baseball Collusion Case Win Free Agency, N.Y. Times, January 23,
1988, at Al, col. 4; A48, col. 1. Arbitrator Roberts also ordered back pay proceedings to
determine how much each free agent lost as a result of the owners' contractual violation.
Arbitrator George Nicolau has conducted hearings in a similar case involving the 1987 free
agents and found there was evidence present of a pattern of information trading by the
clubs. Free-agent Conspiracy, Miami Herald, July 5, 1988, at 2D. The Players Association
has also filed a grievance on behalf of the 1988 free agents. The beat goes on.
29. It is too early to gauge the full impact of the Roberts award. His decision clearly
reshapes the relationship between the parties and may be as important as the Seitz award
twelve years earlier. Management will pay for its contract violation and the Players Associa-
tion will enjoy its triumph. In the long run, however, the stability of an arbitration outcome
depends upon the disparate economic power of the parties. The terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, which was the source of Roberts's decision, reflect that power balance.
When the contract expires in 1990, the parties will readjust the terms and conditions of
employment through peaceful negotiations or, more likely, through use of economic weap-
ons. When that smoke clears, we will have a better vision of the long-term impact of the
Roberts award. For now, the decision gives the Players Association a bargaining chip, but
the poker game can change with the next deal.
30. A variant of baseball's salary arbitration is used in the National Hockey League.
The arbitrator is allowed to select an appropriate salary for the player and is not limited to
the final offers of the parties. See R. BERRY, W. GOULD & P. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS
[Vol. 5:1
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In their 1973 collective bargaining agreement, the Major
League Baseball Players Association and Major League Baseball
agreed to a procedure to be used to resolve salary disputes between
clubs and individual players. The procedure was applied only to a
limited group of players, those with from two to six years of major
league service, and it set forth detailed rules as to how the process
was to operate. With some minor changes, the procedure operates
much the same way under the current agreement. 1
It might be argued that the salary arbitration procedure was
designed never to be used. Let me explain that rather curious com-
ment. Under salary arbitration, the arbitrator must select as the
player's salary for the coming season either his final demand or the
club's final offer. The arbitrator may not compromise or award any
salary other than one of those two final positions. This "sudden
death" process encourages parties in negotiations to move towards
what we might call the "correct" salary level. This is the salary
which accurately reflects the player's ability and performance. The
final position which is closer to this "correct" salary figure should
prevail. Obviously, each side wants to place its position closer to
that figure than its opponent. It is this movement towards the
middle that encourages voluntary settlements.
Consider this example. Assume that a player's correct salary
based on ability and performance is a million dollars a year.2 As-
sume also that during early negotiations with the club the player
seeks a million and a half dollars and the club offers one-half mil-
lion. Sensing the demand might be too high, the player's agent
would try to reposition its demand closer to the correct salary, per-
haps at $1.2 million. The club, aware its offer is too low and want-
ing to move its offer closer to the correct salary than the player's
demand, would raise its offer to $900,000. Not to be outdone, the
player's agent then drops the demand to $1.05 million; the team in
turn raises its offer to $975,000. At this point in the negotiations,
IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 8, at 209-10 (1986).
31. As a result of the 1985 negotiations, eligibility for salary arbitration was limited to
players with from three to six years of major league service. This allowed clubs to pay play-
ers lower salaries for two full years prior to having to adjust to market realities - or face
salary arbitration - in the third year. The result has been considerably lower second year
salaries for baseball players. In 1986, the last year 2-year players were eligible for arbitra-
tion, players with 2-3 years of Major League service had an average salary of $309,604. In
1987, that figure dropped to $191,073. Chass, Arbitration Time Gives Clubs Something to
Fear, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, at § 5, p. 25, col. 2.
32. The "correct" salary would be determined primarily by comparing the perform-
ance statistics of the player with those of all other players, especially those with similar
number of years of major league service.
19881
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the parties are only small change apart. They are more than likely
to settle their dispute.3 3 The dynamics of final offer salary arbitra-
tion drive the parties toward settlement.34 That has been the ac-
tual experience, with over 90% of the cases settled prior to hear-
ing. Some cases are not settled because the parties differ as to the
real worth of the player's services. At times, the parties have per-
sonal differences which inhibit voluntary agreement, and, as a re-
sult, the outside neutral must set the salary. The arbitrator, of
course, can always be blamed for an unhappy outcome. It is not
only at the ball park that people want to shout: "Kill the ump.'
'31
What happens when a case actually does come to arbitration?
Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the arbi-
trator is limited to considering certain criteria in choosing between
the final offer and the final demand. The player's performance in
the prior season and over his career are considered, as well as his
prior compensation. The player's physical or mental condition and
the club's performance are also considered.36 The criterion that
stands out from the rest in practical importance is the so-called
"comparables," that is, the salaries of other Major League baseball
players with comparable statistics. 7 The parties submit joint ex-
33. There are important side benefits to voluntary agreements in lieu of an imposed
salary. Both sides may be able to claim victory. An imposed salary through arbitration may
diminish the morale of a player who loses or color the attitude of management towards a
victorious player.
34. Settlements are common even after the final offer and demand are submitted
through the salary arbitration process. Each side continues to reevaluate its position. Con-
cerned that their position is further from the "correct" salary than their opponent, a settle-
ment may be preferable to a greater loss through arbitration.
35. Baseball umpires - whether those on the field or in the hearing room - are sub-
ject to criticism and abuse. Christy Mathewson, Hall of Fame pitcher for the New York
Giants, is reported to have said: "Many fans look upon an umpire as a sort of necessary evil
to the luxury of baseball, like the odor that follows an automobile." Kaplan, What's Killing
the Umps, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, (Sunday Magazine), at 52.
36. It is predictable that in arbitration the player's performance the prior year will be
a positive factor for the player, while the club will attempt to show that the prior year was a
fluke. Problems with the player's physical and mental condition, referred to in the collective
bargaining agreement as "defects," would probably be raised only by the club. It is difficult
to know how the club's performance the prior year fits into this scheme, but it is one of the
contract criteria.
The parties' 1985 collective bargaining agreement added a new enigmatic criterion to
the contract. Effective in 1987, the arbitrator was required to:
give particular attention, for comparative salary purposes, to contracts of players
with Major League Service not exceeding one annual service group above the
Player's annual service group. Nothing herein shall limit the ability of a Player,
because of special accomplishment, to argue the equal relevance of salaries of
Players without regard to service, and the arbitrator shall give whatever weight
to such argument as he (or she) deems appropriate.
37. The agreement's terms do not make the "comparables" more important, but the
[Vol. 5:1
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hibits to the arbitrator containing salary and performance data for
all Major League baseball players, although, as might be expected,
they do not agree on what this information means. 8
The arbitrator attempts to determine the fair market value of
the player based on the information presented at the hearing. In
effect, the arbitrator acts as a substitute for the free market, be-
cause the club and the player have been unable to reach agree-
ment. The arbitrator's job is to place the player at his appropriate
place in the established Major League's salary structure.3 "
Under the rules set forth in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the hearing is private.40 The player and the club are present
with their representatives. The Players Association's representa-
tive is also present, although he or she does not normally partici-
pate in the hearing. Each side is alloted one hour for its initial
presentation and a half hour for rebuttal. By custom, the player's
side proceeds first. Each party offers the arbitrator a written brief
of arguments and statistics, of which certain portions are empha-
sized and explained during the oral presentations.
The arbitrator leaves the hearing with a standard player con-
tract, signed by the player and the club's representative. There is
one space open in paragraph 2 where the arbitrator is to fill in a
single number: either the player's final demand or the club's final
offer. The arbitrator has twenty-four hours in which to render his
decision. He does so by telephone, then fills in the blank in the
standard player contract and forwards it to the parties."1
actual practice of salary arbitration suggests that it is this criterion that is outcome
determinative.
38. The parties cannot even agree on how much the players are paid. The Players
Association's interpretation of salary figures inflates the current value of the contracts by
adding the present value of deferred payments; management's interpretation diminishes sal-
ary levels by relying only on actual current earnings, leaving future earnings to future years.
39. It is not the arbitrator's role to predict the player's performance during the coming
season. As any baseball scout will tell you, that is difficult enough for a professional baseball
person. Salary arbitrators examine past performance and the outcomes "operate as a reward
for past excellence." Note, Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration, supra note 16, at
259.
Curiously, the parties do not inquire whether their salary arbitrators are familiar with
the game of baseball before they select them to sit as neutrals. They choose well-established,
generally acceptable arbitrators who regularly resolve disputes in a variety of industries.
Over the years, a cadre of experienced salary arbitrators has been created. It was not always
the case. A few years ago, an arbitrator hearing a salary arbitration dispute concerning a
relief pitcher listened to almost two hours of presentations before he asked: "What is a
save?"
40. The hearings are conducted in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles during the
first three weeks of February.
41. For his work the arbitrator receives the comparatively modest sum of $450.00, plus
1988]
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There can be little doubt the parties knew what they were do-
ing when they created salary arbitration. They wanted a procedure
that would fix the contested salaries of baseball players in a final
and binding manner. They wanted to prevent players from with-
holding their services and they achieved that goal. There are no
hold-outs after salary arbitration. Players who enter the salary ar-
bitration process report to spring training as scheduled. 2
There also can be little doubt that the salary arbitration pro-
cess has dramatically increased salaries, especially when combined
with the inflating effect of free agency. 43 These two salary-deter-
mining processes have whipsawed each other to raise the current
average major league salary to $513,730."' Management might not
be happy with the current salary level, but the results certainly
were foreseeable.'5
Salary arbitration is a striking example of labor relations crea-
tivity. It is not easy work for an arbitrator, but it does have its
unique aspects. I have resolved hundreds of grievances in the last
expenses, but no study time and no travel time.
42. One side effect of limiting eligibility to players with three years of Major League
service was an increase in the number of spring training holdouts by players not yet eligible
for salary arbitration and free agency during the past four years.
43. Ray Grebey strongly criticized salary arbitration in Another Look at Baseball's
Salary Arbitration, 38 ARB. J. 24 (1983), complaining about its impact on salaries. Marvin
Miller, who was involved in designing the process for the Major League Baseball Players
Association, responded in Arbitration of Baseball Salaries: Impartial Adjudication in Place
of Management Fiat, 38 ARB. J. 31 (1983), by comparing the current system of salary arbi-
tration and free agency with the pre-1974 era of salary determination by management fiat.
44. The Sporting News, April 17, 1989, at 24 col. 3. This represents an increase of
14.2% over 1988. Many people are appalled by the income of professional athletes. Is a star
pitcher worth over $2,766,666.00 a year? Obviously, someone thinks so, because that is what
the Dodgers pay World Series star Orel Hershiser. For a revealing discussion of how Her-
shiser's agent negotiated this record-breaking salary, see Nocera, The Man With the Golden
Arm, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1989, at 42-48. We don't set salaries in this country by govern-
ment fiat. The unfairness of high pay for entertainers as compared with woefully low sala-
ries for school teachers, for example, cannot be redressed except by the laws of supply and
demand. The antitrust laws (which apply to all interstate businesses except baseball) outlaw
collusive action by employers pursuing lower wages for their workers. We let the market
decide instead. If all the fans who rail against salaries boycotted the games they love until
ticket prices were lowered, salaries would plummet. Do you think those who complain would
relinquish their treasured season tickets?
45. Notwithstanding any unhappiness with the salary level, management wins more
cases than it loses. From 1974 until 1987 there were 268 salary arbitration cases. Owners
have won 150, or 56% of them. Baseball Arbitration at a Glance, USA Today, Jan. 20, 1988,
at C1l, col. 6. More recently, owners have increased their winning percentage. In 1987 and
1988 owners won over 60% of the cases actually resolved by the arbitrators. Not all "wins"
are the same, however. In 1988, Andre Dawson lost his case and still received a salary in-
crease of $1.15 million. In 1989 owners suffered their first "salary arbitration season" loss
since 1981, winning five cases while losing seven. Bodley, Arbitration Adds $35M to '89
Payroll, USA Today, Feb. 20, 1989, at C1, col. 2.
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decade and a half, but the only cases anyone ever asks me about
are the two salary arbitration cases I heard a few years back.46 Af-
ter all, it was the only time I have been mentioned in the New
York Times, Sports Illustrated, Sport Magazine, and The Sporting
News. It was the closest I have come to experiencing "the thrill of
victory and the agony of defeat." The media hardly ever reports
my other decisions.
The practice of labor relations in professional sports is far
from perfect. Professional sports have been afflicted with labor
strife for a variety of reasons. There is a great deal of money in-
volved and the ever-present question of how the pie should be cut
remains hotly contested. Moreover, the personalities of the indi-
viduals involved often get in the way of peaceful dispute resolu-
tion. Some people can be very greedy. Player careers are short and
filled with uncertainty; they can be ended in an instant due to
physical injury. Owners are normally quite successful entrepre-
neurs in their own right before they purchase a franchise. Collec-
tive bargaining may be foreign to many of them, especially in the
sports law context."7 In some sports, players have developed a soli-
darity based on shared experiences that the owners have not al-
ways appreciated. All of these factors combine to make easy agree-
ment in sports negotiations as likely as a .400 hitter.48
The representatives of management and labor have created
contract methods for resolving disputes which arise during the
terms of their collective bargaining agreements. Here arbitration
46. In 1986, I decided the salary arbitration cases of the New York Mets' Ron Darling
and the Cleveland Indians' Brett Butler, who is now with the San Francisco Giants.
47. Professor Gary R. Roberts makes this point forcefully in his recent article, The
Shame of Labor Relations in Professional Sports, 6 SPORTS LAW. 4, 6 (Summer 1986).
48. The future does not appear any brighter for sports labor relations. At this writing,
football players are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, but the National Foot-
ball League Players Association has brought an antitrust suit against the league and the
clubs in federal court. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988)
(holding teams protected by nonstatutory labor exemption, but reserving decision until res-
olution of whether "impasse" has been reached in mandatory bargaining subjects). The Na-
tional Basketball Players Association at first followed the same strategy after their agree-
ment expired, Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, No. 87-4189 (D. N.J. 1987),
but on April 26, 1988, reached agreement with the owners on a six year collective bargaining
agreement dramatically expanding free agency rights and decreasing the number of rounds
in the player draft. USA Today, April 27, 1988, at C3. Baseball's collective bargaining agree-
ment expires in 1990 and Donald Fehr, Executive Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association, was recently quoted as saying: "I don't like the trend. Relations are not
getting better. The litigation we're in is getting nastier .... This industry doesn't seem to
be able to develop a mature collective bargaining posture." The Sporting News, March 28,
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plays a most important role. Negotiations over new contracts have
proven more difficult exercises. Every football negotiation since
1968 has been accompanied by some form of a work stoppage, and
the NFL Players Association debacle in 1987 is only the most re-
cent example of how uncertain life can be in sports labor relations
playing field. When peaceful methods of resolving differences fail
and the games we love are interrupted, everyone gets upset. If it
comes as any consolation - and I'm sure that it does not - no
one misses the games more than a sports labor arbitrator.
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